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The New Creatures of Difference: A Look at the Concept of 
Repetition Within Dissipative Systems Theory 
 
Robert Drury King 
Sierra Nevada College and Centre Leo Apostel, Free University of Brussels 
Repetition is a major theme in contemporary thought, aligned more with difference and monstrosity than 
similarity and banality. This paper examines the logic of repetition through its deployment as a critique of the 
Western philosophical tradition’s understanding of time as temporal succession and examines the development 
of new concepts of repetition in dissipative systems theory and evolutionary thinking. 
 
I. Introduction 
Repetition is undoubtedly a major theme in contemporary thought.  It is both mysterious and 
common, both overwhelming and banal.  Repetition produces monsters and boredom and much else 
besides.  It is excessive and yet simple.  Repetition can always be found, in action, at a border between 
the sayable and the unsayable, the visible and the invisible, the audible and the inaudible, the past, 
present, and future.  What does the term mean?  It tells us little about itself etymologically, standing 
for acts of saying or doing again.1  Yet repetition describes a world that is not only discrete, but one of 
creative process and production; at the most general level, repetition underlies processes of becoming, 
inscription, taking place, and formation.  For many thinkers, repetition is a key concept of the 20th 
century and yet for some, repetition, at least in its application, is less impressive.  Kyle Gann views 
repetition as “perhaps the most stereotypical aspect of minimalist music…” (300).  Robert Fink links it 
with the drudgery of consumerist culture and practice (x-xi). Yet there is undeniably a power proper to 
repetition that takes any sterility and transforms it into something seductive, mysterious, or even life-
threatening.  For instance, Gregory Bateson identified the problem of repetition as a key element in 
alcoholic addiction and recovery.2  For Bateson, the repetition of successive transformations of 
difference, in circuits of creative, systemic linkages, define any alcoholic ‘self,’ in fact, any self or 
better, any creature.  For Bateson, the self is not captured in the Western philosophical tradition 
because this tradition recognises the self in a capacity to repeat some originary identity.  Here, 
alcoholism is mistakenly viewed as the problem of an originary identity that cannot escape from its 
addiction.  But for Bateson, the self is no originary identity, the basic presupposition of the Western 
philosophical tradition is founded upon an error; the self is a creature of a different sort. 
The present essay begins from an insight of Bateson’s about such creatures of difference.  
Bateson reported that in June of 1977 he had begun writing two books: The Evolutionary Idea and 
Every Schoolboy Knows (Mind and Nature, 3-4).  The latter was to be a sort of layman’s primer for 
the more difficult conceptual material of the former, an attempt to examine theories of biological 
evolution through systems theory, cybernetics, and information theory.  Bateson wrote of the former:  
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It seemed to me that in ‘Schoolboy,’ I was laying down very elementary ideas about 
epistemology…, that is, about how we can know anything.  In the pronoun we, I of course 
included the starfish and the redwood forest, the segmenting egg, and the Senate of the 
United States.  And in the anything which these creatures variously know, I included “how 
to grow into five-way symmetry, “how to survive a forest fire,” “how to grow and still stay 
the same shape,”…and so on.  Marvelous creatures with almost miraculous knowledges 
and skills. (Mind and Nature, 4) 
Drawing together many of the same elements as Bateson’s inquiries into marvelous creatures, 
this essay also draws from inquiries in epistemology, systems theory, and evolutionary biology to 
examine repetition as a creature of difference.  Here, repetition recasts traditional concepts of 
difference, identity, and change.  Thus it should be no surprise that the work of Gilles Deleuze is a key 
reference.  French philosopher Gilles Deleuze had perhaps gone furthest in endowing the problem of 
repetition with a measure of the impact it deserves to be credited with in contemporary thought.  His 
Difference and Repetition offers one of the most sustained meditations on the concept of repetition in 
the history of Western philosophy, including in its relation to this tradition’s concepts of difference 
and identity.  Moreover, 20th century reflections on repetition in every intellectual domain are rife 
with references to Deleuze’s master-work on the subject.  
Deleuze identifies not one, but two forms of repetition.  Firstly, the common association: 
repetition looks like a mechanical replication of the past moment or previous figure.  Secondly, there 
is a clothed, disguised, or secret repetition, a creature of difference.  For Deleuze: 
The first repetition is repetition of the Same, explicable by the identity of the concept or 
representation; the second repetition comprehends difference, and comprehends itself as 
the alterity of the Idea…. The first is negation, in the absence of the concept, the second, 
affirmation, due to its excess over the Idea…the first is committed to equality, 
commensurability, symmetry, the second is founded on inequality, incommensurability, 
dissymmetry.  The first is material, the second spiritual…. The first is inanimate, the 
second the secret of our deaths and lives, our slaveries and liberations, the demonic and 
the divine.  The first is ‘naked’ repetition, the other a clothed repetition, which comes into 
being in clothing itself, in masking and disguise. (36-37) 
When we view repetition as repetition of the same, as a discretely added ‘next’ in a series of what is, at 
root, the same phenomena (some x across different moments of time or space), we do not see what 
drives repetition as a process.  For Deleuze, we are compelled to this view of repetition, an act of 
addition of things to like things, from one to the next, precisely because we rely upon the traditional 
conceptual tools of the Western philosophical tradition of representation.  The Western philosophical 
tradition of representation takes presence-to-self (as in a consciousness that is a self precisely because 
it can find itself again and again in an act of re-cognition) or identity (A = A and the logical laws 
deriving from this first principle) to be the basis for conceiving whatever phenomena under 
consideration.  With the traditional tools, repetition must be conceived either as the same (a repeated 
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x) or as the opposite or elimination of alterity or difference (if repetition is just to be another x, then 
under no circumstance can any repetition be too dissimilar from the x it repeats; thus, repetition in 
the traditional sense can also capture the idea of a phenomena which is not not-x).  But for Deleuze, 
repetition is precisely a differentiating process, one whereby such discrete repetitions of the same can 
become objects of our empirical perception in the first place.  Repetition, in its secret and clothed 
form, in its masks and disguises, covers itself up in the process of creating.  This is because while in 
routine, empirical perception we recognise repetition in its bare and mechanical form, there would be 
no element to re-cognise if repetition in its secret and creative form was not creating the differences 
our perception eventually latches on to and synthesises in its acts of (re-)presentation.  Thus, 
repetition is fundamentally creative, not (re-)duplicative.  If repetition can be duplicated and 
represented, it is because it is, foremost, creative.  
In what follows I will outline the logic that unlocks the paradox of these statements.  First, 
taking a nod from Deleuze, but relying more heavily on the work of Jacques Derrida—another major 
philosopher who positioned concepts of difference and repetition at the core of his thinking—I will 
describe the philosophical logic of temporal repetition upon which traditional understandings of 
repetition have run aground.  Next, connecting philosophical reflection to Bateson’s tradition of 
systems theory, I will describe a dissipative, thermodynamic systems view4  of repetition that explains 
how disequilibrium dynamics are used to generate creativity through the repetition of systemic cycles 
and processes of structural maintenance and construction.  By disequilibrium, I refer to a 
thermodynamic precondition which must be in place for any phenomena to come into being.  Put 
briefly, the Western philosophical tradition’s concepts of self-presence and identity are concepts that 
take equilibrium to be the basic property of a phenomena (a phenomena only is if it is in a state of 
relative equilibrium with itself, that is, if a phenomena is in a state of disequilibrium with itself, 
whether through breakdown, decay, or becoming-other, then it cannot be or be recognized as such).  
Under Deleuze’s view, though, since repetition is precisely a differentiating process, conditions of 
disequilibrium must be used to define it.  Here, processes of disequilibrium, processes of becoming-
other, dissolution, decay—creative, monstrous, and creaturely processes indeed—do a much better job 
of indicating what is basic to repetition.  Lastly, I will link the systems view of repetition with 
evolutionary, biological thinking.  Since the domain of evolution is clearly a creative domain of 
creaturely life, it will aid the general aims of this essay to describe the ways in which a seemingly 
redundant process like repetition is better appreciated as a creature of difference. 
II. The Logic of Repetition 
As Derrida points out, the logic of repetition is already at work in the early classics of the 
Western philosophical tradition, notably, in Aristotle’s writings on the logic of temporal succession.  
Derrida’s reading of Aristotle demonstrates how the attempt to understand time as a temporal 
succession of moments (a discrete series of nows following one upon the other as in the seconds 
marked by a clock ticking away, 12:00:01, 12:00:02, etc.) demonstrates the difficulty of conceiving 
time as a bare, simple, or mechanical repetition.5  Derrida’s deconstructive logic begins from the point 
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of view that being is an impossibility, at least as first and indivisible, originary moment or substance.  
The Derridian premise of this point is the following: it is impossible to be, as originary moment or 
substance, because just what it is to be is to become other.  Thus, any originary condition is already a 
becoming other (and in fact, a repetition of this process of becoming other).  This logic is specified 
elegantly in Martin Hägglund’s reading of Derrida’s gloss on Aristotle’s notion of temporal succession 
in his fourth book of the Physics, where, according to Hägglund, “[t]he temporal,” construed as first or 
originary moment, “can never be in itself, but is always disjoined between being no longer and being 
not yet” (42).  As Hagglund has it:  
Aristotle here points out that there would be no time if there were only one single now 
[218b]. Rather, there must be at least two nows—‘an earlier one before and a later one 
after” [219a]—in order for there to be time.’  Time is thus defined as succession, where 
each now is always superseded by another now. In thinking succession, however, Aristotle 
realizes that it contradicts his concept of identity as presence in itself. A self-present, 
indivisible now could never even begin to give way to another now, since what is 
indivisible cannot be altered. This observation leads Aristotle to an impasse, since his 
logic of identity cannot account for the succession that constitutes time. (42) 
Of course it is not difficult to notice that the order of the temporal succession described in the 
quotation is a repetition of discrete, isolatable moments, repetition in the naked and mechanical 
sense.  The conditions upon which this kind of mechanical series of repeated moments rest, though, 
include: 1) a notion of discrete, fixed or unalterable identity for any (temporal) moment/s; 2) a 
separation or distinguishing of moments (here undertaken by the failed attempt to think time as such 
a series); 3) such that the phenomena under consideration (here, time) can be counted or registered as 
that which may mark change.  Moreover, if a thinking human subject is not required for 2, then some 
other mechanism or process must nonetheless complete the separation.  For, repetition presupposes 
some type of separation, just to be what it is, even if this separation is not a succession (although 
again, even the act of thinking repetition demands a logic not encompassed by the mechanical 
repetition of the same).  
Indeed, following Derrida and Hägglund’s reading of him, the temporal logic used to criticize 
notions of presence and unalterable identity requires more than a logic of succession.  Derrida wrote: 
Let us consider the sequence of nows. The preceding now, it is said, must be destroyed by 
the following now. But, Aristotle then points out, it cannot be destroyed “in itself” (en 
heautōi), that is, at the moment when it is (now, in act). No more can it be destroyed in an 
other now (en allōi): for then it would not be destroyed as now, itself; and, as a now which 
has been, it is . . . inaccessible to the action of the following now. (57) 
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On such Aristotelian assumptions time cannot be thought through succession or a bare and 
mechanical repetition.  So, too, the presuppositions of a metaphysics that places identity first must be 
given up if one wants to think succession or repetition, even in the simple sense.  Hägglund notes, 
“[t]he now cannot ﬁrst be present in itself and then be affected by its own disappearance, since this 
would require that the now began to pass away after it had ceased to be. Rather, the now must 
disappear in its very event” (42).  Hägglund continues:  
The “past” cannot refer to what has been present, since any past was itself divided from its 
beginning.  Likewise the “future” cannot refer to what will be present, but designates a 
relentless displacement inherent in everything that happens. Any so-called presence is 
divided in its very event, and not only in relation to what precedes or succeeds it….Or 
more exactly: time itself is the impossibility of any “itself.”  This is not a paradox but 
follows from analyzing the minimal definition of time.  Even the slightest temporal 
moment must be divided in its becoming: separating before from after, past from future.  
Without the interval there would be no time, only a presence forever remaining the same. 
(42-43) 
What is the temporal logic that might grasp the passage of the now in its very appearance?  The 
answer to this question involves presuppositions of a process-driven, creative repetition (Deleuze’s 
clothed and secret form).  Such presuppositions allow succession itself to be thought; and as we will 
see further on, such presuppositions are preconditions for any empirical concepts, concepts which 
find a basis in human perception, to be thought.   
A process-driven, creative repetition requires a temporal logic wherein any moment always 
already carries its fading-away within itself.  Through this condition, namely, one in which an 
asymmetry or disequilibrium exists at the core of any repetition, there is created 1) the possibility of a 
lived experience of time, or duration, that carries the additional quality of 2) constituting the 
substantial basis of entities or objects, including temporal moments.  While these qualities of 
repetition are rarely recognised because this logic of repetition is not a part of the dominant 
representationalism and presence-privileging of the Western philosophical tradition, they synthesise 
or generate the differences (the separable moments in succession, say) that make acts of recognition 
possible.  Despite differences between these thinkers,6  the projects of Derrida and Deleuze are notably 
akin in that they attempt a conception of these hidden, clothed, synthetic or generative repetitions of 
difference.  What these thinkers argue is that repetition is repetition of difference, namely, spatio-
temporal differences in disequilibrium (disequilibrium conditions, as I explain below) that must be in 
place for any entities, or experiences of those entities, to be made possible.  Such repetitions of spatial 
and temporal difference are creative and underlie acts of representation.     
The essential consideration for grasping the temporal logic of repetition, then, is that it cannot 
be represented in its clothed, creative dimension using conventional conceptual analysis because 
repetition describes a logic of (creative) difference while the Western tradition of representation has 
taken presence-to-self or identity (A = A and the logical laws deriving from this first principle) to be 
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the basis for conceiving whatever phenomena under consideration.  For instance, within the domain 
of temporality, representational logic tells us that events follow one upon the other in succession, 
cause precedes effect.  While this logic structures causal and narrative sequences which presuppose 
mechanical succession in their simpler forms (in Aristotelian efficient causation or conventional plot), 
it belies efforts to capture the temporality of repetition.  When repetition is viewed as, first, that which 
is already differing from itself, even at the origin, a new logic is required. 
In Deleuze’s account of repetition, for example, time is grounded in repetition of difference 
such that the chronological sequence of any two events must be inverted in order to grasp the 
repetition that makes a simple succession first possible.  The same holds, on Deleuze’s view, for all 
empirical concepts that are subject to our perception.  While representational logic holds that there 
must be a first in the order of succession (the original), a world of creativity and process dictates that 
there can be no first moment; for, any first must already be within temporal process, in disequilibrium 
with respect to any eventual identity that might be constituted and recognized.  Here, the represented 
“original” is already a repeated moment, an effect, in the order of succession.  While Western 
philosophical logic cannot conceive of difference without reliance on the notion of the first or original 
moment, substance, or cause, it must be admitted that the second in the order of succession must be 
considered primary (or first), because it extracts the original from disequilibrium conditions, forming 
a series which constitutes the “original” and which may be used to recognise it empirically in our 
perception.  If something can be counted as “first,” it must mark a difference from the conditions of 
spatio-temporal disequilibrium that would be required to constitute it, but repetition more accurately 
names the (masked) difference—the disequilibrium conditions—that must be in place to create 
anything at all. 
III. Dissipative System Dynamics of Repetition 
When it comes to considering the conditions of creation it is important to ask the following: 
the creation of what?  Thus far I have considered the creation of phenomena and the spatio-temporal, 
disequilibrium conditions of difference that underlie and make possible any phenomena in empirical 
perception.  We should be careful, though, to note that repetition is not solely a philosophical 
phenomena; it is a general one.  While questions of perception are of especial interest to the history of 
philosophy, repetition must be viewed as a general phenomenon.  Recalling Bateson, repetition occurs 
in all variety of creatures, but not just in animal or even plant life.  Repetition is a systemic 
phenomena and characterizes certain aspects of any system.  Specifically, repetition refers to the 
maintenance and construction of any difference(s) creatively generated and employed by a system to 
reproduce itself over time.  In conceiving of repetition as a systemic and general phenomena, then, I 
will rely on a unified, systems-theoretical framework proper to all phenomena as well as to our 
understanding of them: dissipative systems theory.  A systemic basis in the dynamics of entropy 
dissipation supports all phenomena, from the earliest phenomena in the universe, creatures existing 
well prior to any human act of representation, to the most banal or monstrous creatures of the present 
moment.7  
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Additionally, dissipative systems theory provides a convenient link to the philosophical 
reflections in these pages.  Dissipative systems theory is a prominent intellectual tradition that has 
developed the conceptual tools to grasp the thermodynamics of disequilibrium and the ways in which 
conditions of disequilibrium are fundamentally creative. (See Harvey) Outlining dissipative systems 
theory, then, can help in conceiving repetition, construed on the terms of difference.  For, just as 
philosophers like Derrida and Deleuze have provided powerful criticisms of the Western philosophical 
tradition’s usage of presuppositions that take equilibrium conditions to be basic in philosophical 
explanation (as in the attempt to ground temporal succession or origin in the presence-to-self or 
identity of a first moment), dissipative systems theorists have eschewed equilibrium presuppositions 
when understanding the thermodynamics of a general systems view capable of explaining all 
phenomena, whether in philosophy, science, art, etc. (See Prigogine and Stengers). 
Returning briefly to Deleuze, a thinker well-versed in dissipative system concepts, let us take a 
look at the following quotation:    
(Artists) do not juxtapose instances of the figure, but rather each time combine an 
element of one instance with another element of a following instance. They introduce a 
disequilibrium into the dynamic process of construction, an instability, dissymmetry or 
gap of some kind which disappears only in the overall effect. (22) 
The notion of systemic disequilibrium is a key concept in dissipative systems theory and can be 
likened to an act of artistic construction.  After all, systems are precisely constructions: they are sets or 
series of elements in grouped relations, while the grouping of these elements in relation is based on 
the ways in which they maintain themselves, historically, over against perturbations from their 
environments.  Indeed, this is the definition of function.  A system’s function is prescribed by the way 
in which it has historically maintained the relations through which its elements are grouped.  In 
dissipative systems theory, all systems must repeat their structure in the face of the following 
requirement: all systems, in order to be at all, must 1) dissipate or funnel entropy into their 
environmental surroundings and 2) take up new flows or inputs of the energy, matter, and 
information through which they are constructed.  Entropy dissipation and negentropy production 
name a basic, systemic cycle, a core repetition underlying the processes driving any phenomena and 
its possible recognition.  Entropy names the tendency to decay as prescribed in the second law of 
thermodynamics which specifies that, ultimately, systems return to states of equilibrium in relation to 
their environments.  Equilibrium reflects a stasis in systems or between a system and its environment 
in which because there is no flow of matter, energy, and information into or out of a system, the 
system decays; it does not repeat itself.  Such a condition of stasis is not unlike the Western 
philosophical requirement for representation on the laws of self-presence and identity.  
Conversely, negentropy refers to a system’s overcoming the tendency to decay.  Negentropy is 
a particular feature of living systems and proceeds largely through the establishment of auto-catalytic 
cycles (or repetitions), such as we find in our bodily metabolism.  Negentropy is fundamentally a 
repetition of structure, even if, again, this does not imply stasis and identity duplication, but creative 
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maintenance of disequilibrium conditions.  Living systems exist in disequilibrium conditions precisely 
by repeating structure over against tendencies to decay.8  Furthermore, entropy arises both within and 
without systems.  For example, our bodies must constantly repeat their structure by taking in energy, 
matter, and information from the external environment in order to avoid loss of structure, ultimately 
death (this process is also captured in the idea of negentropy); similarly, if our bodies were not fed, 
they would break down internally.  Of course, systems not only maintain their structure, as if it pre-
existed, but constitute or construct this structure through continual or repeated processes of 
dissipating their entropy back out into the environment (a constant exchange of energy, matter, and 
information with an external environment is required).  Thus, on systems terms, repetition refers to 
two distinct processes: one, the maintenance of structure through repetition (of structure) and two, 
the construction or creation of structure.  Both occur against a background of entropy that can only be 
dissipated in disequilibrium conditions.  If a system were not in disequilibrium conditions, it would 
close itself off entirely to the very sources of its creative repetitions of maintenance and construction 
of structure.  This last is the key insight where conceiving repetition as difference and disequilibrium 
is concerned.  Disequilibrium is the necessary precondition for any system capable of maintenance 
and construction of structure over against entropy.  If a system was in some kind of equilibrium with 
itself (e.g., in the philosophically unsound notion of being in identity with itself at its origin) it would 
not be able to maintain or create structure; it could not be, at all.  
Thus, the notion that any temporal moment contains a disequilibrium at its core is a 
consequence of the fact that any phenomena is first constructed as a structure that arises by repeating 
itself in the context of systemic, disequilibrium conditions.  Philosophically speaking, then, the spatio-
temporal differences that occur at the boundary between systems and their environments (including 
the other systems in their environments) define the disequilibrium, instability, asymmetry, etcetera, at 
the core of creative repetitions (of maintenance and of construction) of structure.  Furthermore, it is 
not as if structure becomes the new originary or first term, rather, structure precisely is the result of 
disequilibrium at the origin while repetition is the continuous generation of structure.  Placing these 
insights in the context of evolutionary and biological thinking will help to clarify them more 
concretely.  Imagine the embryo of an animal.  The embryo is a structure that repeats itself through 
creative constructions of spatio-temporal differences (for example, in the resolution of molecular 
concentration gradients which play a role in tissue formation and the building of the body of the 
organism) and yet the embryo itself exists in a disequilibrium state with respect to its environment.  
This disequilibrium is a condition of the structure it, in turn, generates.  Similarly, the embryo first 
emerges from its own set of disequilibrium conditions in its environment. 
IV. Repetition and Evolution 
As a general, systemic phenomena, repetition also characterises the life-process of organisms 
historically, in their evolution.  One can see this by examining the work of Darwin, for example.  For 
Darwin, all organisms are created by mechanisms which are fundamentally repetitions, for instance, 
natural selection (were processes of selection to cease, so too would evolution), phenotypic variation 
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(nature never produces an identical copy, but repeats variations on the organism), and heredity (the 
continual passing off of traits between generations).  Henceforth, within the Darwinian framework of 
evolution, all organisms become results of a logic of repetition that gives pride of place to its creative 
and differential form.  Commenting on this insight, philosopher and ‘Larval Subjects’ blogger, Levi 
Bryant—one of the few philosophers to comment on the relation between Deleuze’s view of repetition 
and the principles of Darwinian, evolutionary biology9  —offers an essential remark as part of a larger 
meditation on Darwin, Deleuze, and posthumanism.  He writes: 
Difference is creative, not deviant. In the old Platonic-Aristotlean-Thomist model of 
nature, difference was seen as a deviation from form or essence.  Organisms were 
measured or evaluated in terms of how closely they approximated an ideal form of what 
organisms are supposed to be.  Thus, for example, a human that had the body of Brad Pitt 
coupled with the reason/intellect of Einstein would be considered more genuine and real 
than a human that had the body of Socrates and the intellect of Forrest Gump.  
Differences that did not approximate the essential features of the form were seen as 
deviations falling out of “true being” and even as potential monstrosities… With Darwin 
all this changes.  Far from being a deviation from “nature”, difference is now the motor, 
the engine, by which nature creates. (Bryant) 
If differences were not generated again and again, there would be no material for Darwinian processes 
of evolution to work upon.  The processes that drive Darwin’s particular formulation of evolution—
variation, selection, and heritability—all entail repetition of various elements of the living organism. 
With variation, repetition must be differential: it is not as if deviant forms are produced, but, following 
upon insights gathered from dissipative systems (and in this case living systems), the repetition of 
new organisms (and their genetic material) derives from disequilibrium conditions and so, produces 
variation set at disequilibrium.  No identical copy of an organism (or its DNA, for instance) can be 
generated because the disequilibrium conditions for generation must be maintained.  A return to 
equilibrium in the generation of organisms would, as mentioned above, bring about an entropy 
capable of putting an end to the evolutionary process.  The same holds for processes of selection and 
heritability.  Additionally, variation for Darwin was random, but this referred to processes of 
repetition whereby slight differences were produced and, if selected, taken up in heredity and 
preserved.  As Bryant pointed out in a continuation of the passage quoted above, random does not 
mean that Darwinian difference was without basis.10  Rather, precise mechanisms or better, creative 
repetitions of structure carried organisms down various lines of evolutionary descent.  Did Darwin 
himself possess this more contemporary view of repetition as creative difference? 
Of course Darwin himself had no understanding of Mendelian (or post-Mendelian) genetics, 
of DNA, molecular biology or even of any modern version of dissipative system dynamics and the 
disequilibrium conditions driving those dynamics.  Stated otherwise, he had little understanding of 
many of the creative repetitions of structure outlined above.  Still, the “modern evolutionary 
synthesis,” or “neo-Darwinian synthesis” of the 20th century is well-known for its attempt to resurrect 
FORUM | ISSUE 15 Robert Drury King 10 
 
 
 
 
the Darwinian theoretical paradigm, with its core theory of natural selection, by updating it alongside 
insights gathered from the science of genetics and the application of statistical methods to this 
science.11  Still, the neo-Darwinian framework of evolution was scrutinised by molecular and systems-
minded biologists for that within it which lent itself to a more conservative reading of repetition and 
for its attachment to the random and unstructured accumulationist version of evolutionary change as 
a series of accidents capitalized upon through more or less heroic efforts of individual adaptation;12  
essentially, for its underestimation of the roles that systemically structured repetitions play in 
evolution.  Many systems biologists—those whose starting point for understanding evolution was no 
longer the organism as individual, adapting slowly to environmental pressures from without, but who 
began to locate the riddle of evolution in more complex relations of environment and history—heavily 
criticized the neo-Darwinians precisely for their desire to preserve a synthetic theory of evolution 
based on the centrality of the individual, conceived in equilibrium with itself.  A fairly representative 
statement of what is at stake in this criticism has been expressed by David J. Depew and Bruce H. 
Weber.  They state: 
The fact that nonequilibrium thermodynamical principles have not hitherto been invoked 
as an appropriate backing for an expanded synthesis is due in large measure… to a 
historically contingent preference of the Darwinian tradition for background assumptions 
deriving from models of system dynamics in which impinging ‘forces’ disturb an assumed 
equilibrium in order to account for change. (460) 
Levi Bryant has stated that Darwin should be credited with the view “that matter is capable of 
generating pattern, or self-organising [because of its roots in disequilibrium], or maintaining pattern 
across time…At the core of Darwin’s thought is the thesis that matter has the capacity to self-organise, 
to form pattern, to generate life” (Bryant).  Still, certain assumptions of the classical Darwinian 
framework do appear to favor a more traditional view of the individual, despite Darwin’s deeper 
insights into the creative and differentiating role of repetition.  
The philosophical challenge to be posed to the more conservative adherents to classical 
Darwinism seem to be the following: does Darwinism require individuals to be conceived on the 
model of identity?  Can the core of Darwinism withstand its conforming to a model of difference that 
requires a conception of the repetition of structure in dissipative conditions of disequilibrium?  What 
happens to the study of evolution when what evolves becomes a creature of difference rather than an 
individual?  As Depew and Weber would no doubt confirm, repetition, conceived in light of 
disequilibrium thermodynamic principles, is a prominent and valuable concept in evolutionary 
thinking and, if conceived on the presuppositions of contemporary systems thought, may offer a 
unified perspective on a range of intellectual, scientific and artistic, domains.  Dissipative systems 
theory, which views repetition—all phenomena—as results of disequilibrium, dissipative system 
dynamics, may serve this unifying function.  In any case, a concept of repetition as creative difference 
placed within a dissipative systems view provides fascinating alternatives to more traditional 
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assumptions in contemporary thought and indeed, seems to be where more monstrous conceptions of 
repetition and the new creatures of difference are heading. 
--- 
Notes 
1 The word gains prominence in the 1520s where it is identified with the “act of saying over again,” 
from L. repetitionem (nom. repetitio), from pp. stem of repetere “do or say again.” Accusative singular 
of repetitio. 
2 Bateson views alcoholism, and any possible recovery from it, as part of successive transformations of 
difference being repeated through various systemic circuits of immanent relational wholes.  
3 By thermodynamic systems view, I refer to the science of thermodynamics which studies 
relationships of the conversion of heat and other forms of energy (including more complex forms of 
matter and information) that occur in or between systems, or between system(s) and their 
environment.  
4 This section of the essay owes a great debt to Martin Hägglund, whose greatest contribution to the 
scholarship on Derrida lies perhaps in his clarification of the logic of temporality.  Without Hägglund’s 
work on this issue, I would not have seen Derrida’s work in the lights described above.  
5 See the book Between Deleuze and Derrida (2003), which does a good job of summarizing the 
differences and similarities between these thinkers. 
6 See Ervin Laszlo whose book, Evolution: The General Theory (1996), remains one of the best general 
guides to the theory of dissipative systems theory as a general theory of evolutionary change.  It also 
contains an excellent introduction to the basic concepts of dissipative systems theory. 
7 This insight is captured wonderfully in the autopoietic systems theory of Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela.  See their Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (1980) and The 
Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding (1992). 
8 Bryant encapsulates the relation nicely on the following terms: “[w]ith Darwin difference becomes 
the essence of nature.  In Deleuze’s words, repetition is always repetition with a difference.”  See 
Bryant, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/04/02/eight-darwinianposthumanist-theses/. 
9 Bryant notes, “It’s not simply that there are random variations in nature, it’s that all replication 
(reproduction/copying) produces slight differences from the previous entity from which it is copied.  
In the Darwinian universe there are no perfect copies, only simulacra that deviate, ever so slightly, 
from the entity from which they were copied.  In the old theological Nature, difference was seen as an 
abomination contaminating the purity of essence, form, the identical, and the same.  With Darwin 
difference becomes the essence of nature.  In Deleuze’s words, repetition is always repetition with a 
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difference.”  See Bryant,  http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/04/02/eight-
darwinianposthumanist-theses/. 
10 One thinks of the seminal contributions of scientists like Ronald A. Fisher, J.B.S. Haldane, and 
Sewall Wright to the new evolutionary synthesis. 
11 This challenge to the new evolutionary synthesis goes back to the 1940s, 50s and 60s, but probably 
becomes programmatically articulated in the early 70s.  See the excellent overview of this history in 
the introductory chapter to David J. Depew and Bruce H. Weber’s “Darwinism Evolving” (1995). 
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